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COMMENTS
ABSTENTION UNDER ERISA: LEVY V. LEWIS
Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA)1 to protect employees' benefit rights by establishing minimum
standards for the regulation of certain private employee benefits plans.
2
Widespread abuses in the management of employee benefit plans, com-
bined with the chaotic condition of state law governing benefit plans,
often rendered promised benefits illusory.' In enacting ERISA, Congress
sought to establish a comprehensive uniform scheme regulating covered
employee benefit plans" to assure that such plans would be equitable,
properly managed, and financially sound.5 ERISA regulations on the
operation and administration of covered plans' expressly preempt rele-
I Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976))
[hereinafter referred to as ERISA or the Act]. See generally S. GOLDBERG, PENSION PLANS
UNDER ERISA (1976).
2 ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1976); General Motors Corp. v. Buha, 623 F.2d 455,
459 (6th Cir. 1980) (ERISA enacted to protect employees' benefit rights).
ERISA covers private employee benefit plans, which include both employee welfare
benefit plans and employee pension benefit plans. ERISA § 3(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1976).
An employee welfare benefit plan is any plan, fund or program maintained by an employer
which provides various non-income benefits, such as health care benefits, including benefits
secured through the purchase of insurance. Id. at § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). An employee
pension benefit plan covers any plan, fund or program maintained by an employer and in-
tended to provide retirement income or which results in the deferral of income. Id. at §
3(2){A)(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(B).
3 See id; H.R. REP. No. 93-533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4639, 4643. See generally Hutchinson and Ifshkin, Federal Preemption
of State Law Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 46 U. CH. L.
REV. 23, 23 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Hutchinson and Ifshkin]; Turza and Halloway,
Preemption of State Law Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,28
CATH. L. REV. 163, 165-66 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Turza and Halloway]; Comment, The
Employer Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: Policies and Problems, 26 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 539, 549 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Security Act].
' See note 2 supra.
5 H.R. REP. No. 93-533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4640.
6 ERISA regulates employee benefit plans by specifying minimum standards for the
operation and administration of covered plans. Id., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4639-43. ERISA regulates covered plans in the following four areas: participation
and vesting, reporting and disclosure, funding, and fiduciary responsibility. ERISA specifies
minimum vesting standards and strict participation requirements to clarify when an
employee is entitled to participate in a plan and when an employee has a vested right to ac-
crued benefits. ERISA §§ 201-11, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-61 (1976). ERISA also establishes re-
quirements for reporting and disclosure to insure that plans are not mismanaged and that
employees are aware of all rights under a plan. Id. §§ 101-111, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-31. A plan
administrator must provide each participant and beneficiary with a summary description of
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vant state law except for state law regulating insurance, banking or
securities.7
The enforcement provisions of ERISA give the Secretary of Labor,
as well as participants and beneficiaries of the benefit plans, broad
remedies for redressing or preventing violations of the ERISA guide-
lines.' Congress intended to remove jurisdictional and procedural
obstacles to the effective enforcement of ERISA by providing a full
range of legal and equitable remedies. Congress expressly entrusted
general enforcement of ERISA to the federal district courts by granting
federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over ERISA claims."0 ERISA also
provides that state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction in ac-
tions involving the contractual interpretation of a plan." Under the con-
current jurisdiction provision, participants or beneficiaries of an ERISA
the plan, as well as his rights and obligations under ERISA. Id. §§ 101(a)(1), 102(a)(1),
104(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021(a)(1), 1022(a)(1), 1024(b)(1). ERISA specifies minimum funding
levels to assure that covered plans are properly financed. Id. §§ 301-06, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-86.
ERISA also imposes fiduciary duties on any person who exercises any discretionary
authority or control over the management of a plan or the disposition of its assets. Id §§
3(21(A), 401-14, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(21)(a), 1101-14. A fiduciary must discharge his duties solely
in the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries. Id. §§ 403(c)(1), 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §§
1103(c)(1), 1104(a)(1). See generally, Security Act, note 3, supra at 556-80, 596-606, 660-66;
Comment, Who's Afraid of ERISA Wolf: § 405(d and other Houses of Straw for Trustees
Under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
921 (1975).
ERISA §§ 514(a), 514(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(a), 1144(2)(A) (1976). Courts and com-
mentators have affirmed that Congress intended ERISA to have broad preemptive effect.
Murphy v. The Heppenstall Co., Nos. 80-1690, 80-1724, slip op. at 8 (3d Cir., filed Dec. 10,
1980) (ERISA wholly regulates and federalizes the pension field); Central States Fund v. Old
Security Life Ins. Co., 600 F.2d 671, 676 (7th Cir. 1979) (ERISA preempts all state law
related to covered plans); Hutchinson and Ifshkin, supra note 3, at 23, 24; Turza and
Halloway, supra note 3, at 168-69.
Courts continue to narrow ERISA's preemptive scope. See AT&T v. Merry, 592 F.2d
118, 124 (2d Cir. 1979) (domestic relations law not preempted by ERISA, therefore, pension
payments can be garnished for support payments); In Re Marriages of Lionberger, 97 Cal.
App. 3d 56, 66, - Cal. Rptr. - , .. (1979) (ERISA does not preempt California's com-
munity property laws); Lukus v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 419 F.2d 431, 445 (Pa. Super.
1980) (ERISA does not preempt Pennsylvania Human Relations Act forbidding sex
discrimination).
I H.R. REP. No. 93-533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4655.
9 Id. Congress failed to articulate the legal and equitable remedies created by ERISA.
Apparently, Congress presumed that the grant of federal jurisdiction would remove juris-
dictional obstacles that had hindered the enforcement of pension plans under state law.
1* See ERISA § 502(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (1976). United States District Courts
have exclusive jurisdiction of ERISA civil actions brought by the Secretary of Labor, par-
ticipants, beneficiaries, or fiduciaries except in actions involving interpretation of plan
terms in which state courts have concurrent jurisdiction. Id.; see Tagliaferri v. Weiss Bros.
Stores, Inc., 388 So. 2d 765, 767 (La. Supr. 1980).
11 ERISA §§ 502(e)(1), 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(e)(1), 1132(a)(1)(B) (1976). Congress
failed to articulate the policy reasons for granting concurrent jurisdiction. Congress in-
tended ERISA's enforcement provisions to provide broad remedies for violations of the Act
and to remove jurisdictional and procedural obstacles to effective enforcement of the Act.
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plan can bring a civil action in state or federal court to receive benefits,
enforce rights or clarify future benefit rights under the terms of a plan.12
ERISA's grant of concurrent jurisdiction, however, can create conflicts
between state and federal courts that, in effect, raise new procedural
and jurisdictional obstacles to effective enforcement of ERISA.
In Levy v. Lewis," the Second Circuit abstained from deciding an
ERISA question," and thereby denied the plaintiff access to a federal
forum for an ERISA action. Appellee Lewis, the New York State Super-
intendent of Insurance, had instituted proceedings to liquidate Consoli-
dated Mutual Insurance Company (CMIC) pursuant to a state court
order."5 Lewis terminated CMIC's retirees' benefit plans to preserve
CMIC's assets for policyholders and general creditors. 6 While the pro-
ceedings were pending before the state referee," Levy, a retired CMIC
employee, brought suit in the Southern District of New York on behalf of
similarly situated retirees. 8 Levy alleged that ERISA governed CMIC's
benefit plans and that Lewis's termination of the plan violated ERISA.19
Levy also alleged that by terminating the benefit plans, Lewis, as
trustee of the plan, violated a fiduciary duty under ERISA.2°
H.R REP. No. 93-533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4655. Although concurrent jurisdiction does not provide broader remedies under ERISA,
Congress may have granted concurrent jurisdiction in order to promote access to both state
and federal courts by aggrieved participants and beneficiaries seeking interpretation or en-
forcement of an ERISA plan.
11 ERISA §§ 502(e)(1), 502(a}(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(e)(1), 1132(a}(1)(B) (1976); see notes
9-10 supra.
IS 635 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1980).
SId. at 963.
I Id at 962. On May 31, 1979, the New York Supreme Court appointed Lewis to li-
quidate CMIC as authorized by New York Insurance Law. Id.; N.Y. INS. LAW § 526 (McKin-
ney) (1966). Article XVI of the New York Insurance Law delineates regulations for the
rehabilitation, liquidation, conservation and dissolution of insurance companies. Section 526
authorizes the Superintendent of Insurance to petition the court for orders to liquidate. Id.
Sections 517-24 adopted the Uniform Insurers' Liquidation Act. Id §§ 517-24.
11 635 F.2d at 962. The Superintendent of Insurance is vested with title to all property
and contracts of the insurance company in liquidation. N.Y. INs. LAW § 514 (McKinney)
(1966). The Superintendent has the duty to liquidate the assets of the company for distribu-
tion to creditors. Id. §§ 514(1), 539, 545(1).
11 After Lewis terminated the plans, Levy and four other retirees filed a Notice of
Claim with Lewis, pursuant to § 544 of the New York Insurance Law, seeking to restore
benefits under the employee benefit plan. 635 F.2d at 962. On October 19, 1979, Lewis
denied the claims and instituted special proceedings in New York's Supreme Court to affirm
his decision. Id. On November 19, 1979, the New York Supreme Court referred the pro-
ceedings to a state referee. Id.
11 Id. Levy alleged that CMIC's benefit plans for retirees constituted an employee
welfare benefit plan under ERISA § 3(1}(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(11(A) (1976), and that Lewis'
termination violated the terms of the plans. Levy sought to enforce the plan under ERISA's
concurrent jurisdiction provisions. ERISA §§ 502(e)(1), 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(e)(1),
1132(a)(1)(B).
1" 635 F.2d at 962; see note 18 supra.
Id. Levy claimed that Lewis was a fiduciary under ERISA § 3(21), 29 U.S.C. §
1002(21) (1976) and that, therefore, Lewis's termination of the plan amounted to a breach of
a fiduciary duty imposed by ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
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The federal district court dismissed the suit." The district court held
that in the event of an employer's insolvency, ERISA did not require the
company to continue a plan which was funded annually out of operating
revenue.
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal on different
grounds.' The Second Circuit held that since there was a concurrent
state proceeding, the district court should have abstained on Levy's first
claim that termination of the benefit plan violated ERISA.2 Since Con-
gress had granted concurrent jurisdiction to enforce such claims5 and
the state liquidation proceeding involved related issues of plan inter-
pretation, the Second Circuit held that abstention was proper to prevent
disruption of the state proceeding. 8 The Second Circuit, however, held
that abstention was improper on the fiduciary claim," because ERISA
vested exclusive jurisdiction over fiduciary claims in federal courts.'
635 F.2d at 962.
22 Id-
I Id. at 963.
24 Id.
' Id. at 963-67. Even though the alleged violation of an ERISA plan raised questions of
federal law, the Levy court concluded that proper respect for state officials compelled
deference to the concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts. Id at 964; see notes 45-61 infra.
The Levy court noted the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011, 1015 (1976), evinced a
clear federal policy not to interfere with state regulation of insurance. 635 F.2d at 963-64.
The concurring opinion, however, properly recognized that the McCarran-Ferguson Act
does not preclude federal courts from adjudicating claims simply because insurance com-
panies are involved. Id at 970-71 (Mansfield, J., concurring).
I Id at 963, citing Smith v. Metropolitan Prop. Liab. Ins. Co., 629 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.
1980). Smith held that federal courts should defer to state courts to determine the validity
of an exclusionary clause in an insurance policy. 629 F.2d at 758-59. In Smith, the Second
Circuit emphasized that the insurance industry is regulated primarily by the states. Id- at
761. The Smith court held that abstention is inappropriate unless a case involves both an
unclear state law and significant state policy. I& Smith indicates that the Levy court erred
by abstaining absent unclear state law. See text accompanying notes 62-70 infra.
Only the federal courts have power to provide affirmative relief in cases of exclusive
federal jurisdiction. McGough v. First Arlington National Bank, 519 F.2d 552, 555 (7th Cir.
1975). Abstention, therefore, is inappropriate on claims mandating exclusive federal
jurisdiction. See Levy v. Lewis, 635 F.2d 960, 963 (2d Cir. 1980). Federal courts have refused
to abstain in cases involving a breach of an ERISA fiduciary duty even though parties had
initiated related state proceedings. Central States Fund v. Old Security Life Ins. Co., 600
F.2d 671, 674 (2d Cir. 1979); Marshall v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 558 F.2d 680, 684 (2d Cir.
1977); see text accompanying notes 27 & 28 infra.
The Supreme Court has recognized that a pending state proceeding is not sufficient
grounds to justify abstention in actions that allow concurrent jurisdiction. Colorado River
Water Cons. District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813-17 (1976). Only exceptional cir-
cumstances will justify federal abstention due to a concurrent state proceeding. I& at
817-818; Kraftsman Container Corp. v. Finkelstein, 461 F. Supp. 245, 252-53 (E.D.N.Y. 1978);
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4247 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER]. The decision whether to defer to the con-
current jurisdiction of the state court is in the discretion of the district court. Will v.
Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 662-63 (1978).
365 F.2d at 967.
2, ERISA vests exclusive jurisdiction in federal courts to enforce claims for breach of a
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The abstention doctrine is a narrow exception to the duty of the
federal courts to adjudicate a controversy properly before the court.'
The United States Supreme Court has limited the circumstances appro-
priate for abstention to three general categories.30 In Railroad Commis-
sion of Texas v. Pullman Co. ,3 the Supreme Court recognized that
abstention was appropriate in cases presenting a federal constitutional
issue that might be mooted by a state court determination of relevant
state law.32 In Burford v. Sun Oil Co.," the Court abstained to avoid con-
flicts in the interpretation of state law which might endanger important
state policies.3 Subsequent cases have expanded Burford to justify
abstention to avoid federal interference with specialized state regula-
tory schemes." In Younger v. Harris,38 the Court held that a federal
court should abstain from issuing an injunction that would interfere with
fiduciary duty imposed by ERISA. See ERISA § 502(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (1976); note
10 supra. Federal courts may not abstain from claims mandating exclusive jurisdiction
because only the federal courts have power to provide affirmative relief on such claims.
McGough v. First Arlington National Bank, 519 F.2d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1975). In cases alleg-
ing breach of a fiduciary duty under ERISA, the Second Circuit has refused to defer to a
concurrent state proceeding. Central States Fund v. Old Security Life Ins. Co., 600 F.2d 671,
674 (2d Cir. 1979); Marshall v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 558 F.2d 680, 684 (2d Cir. 1977); Mor-
risey v. Curran, 567 F.2d 546, 549 (2d Cir. 1977).
" Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1975); County
of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959). In Cohens v. Virginia,
Justice Marshall first stressed the obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdic-
tion given them. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (dictum). Generally, a concurrent state
proceeding does not bar the federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over the same sub-
ject matter. McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910); see note 26 supra.
I Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814-17 (1975).
31 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
" Id. at 501. In Pullman, the Court refused to adjudicate the constitutionality of a
Texas Railroad Commission order before a state court determination of the issue. Id. at 500.
The Court concluded that respect for state court independence warranted abstention to
avoid conflict between state and federal authorities. Id. See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN,
D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND FEDERAL
SYSTEM, 980-1009 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART AND WECHSLER].
3 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
' Id. at 334. In Burford, the Sun Oil Co. brought an action in a federal district court to
attack an order of the Texas Railroad Commission granting Burford a permit to drill four
wells in East Texas. Id. at 316-17. The Texas legislature had provided that the Commission's
orders were reviewable exclusively in the state district courts in Travis County. Id. at 326.
After invoking federal diversity jurisdiction, the federal district court dismissed the action.
Id. at 316. On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the federal district court should have
declined to exercise jurisdiction as a matter of sound equitable discretion. I. at 317-318.
Justice Black's majority opinion underscored the thorny complexities of oil and gas regula-
tion and the import of the regulations to Texas policy. Id. at 318, 325. By abstaining, the
federal district court avoided conflicts in interpretation of state law which could endanger
state policy. Id. at 334.
1 Colorado River v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 812-15 (1975) (Burford authorizes
abstention to avoid federal interference in matter of substantial state concern); County of
Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 189 (1959) (Burford authorizes abstention to
avoid federal interference with state administrative process).
- 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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a pending state criminal prosecution." Subsequent cases have expanded
Younger to require abstention in civil actions if the pending state pro-
ceeding involves a vital state interest. 8
Additionally, in cases in which abstention is inappropriate, wise
judicial administration can warrant federal deference to a concurrent
state proceeding in exceptional circumstances. 9 In Colorado River v.
United States," the Supreme Court recognized that principles unrelated
to federal-state relations can support federal deference to a concurrent
state proceeding.4' The Supreme Court emphasized that only exceptional
reasons of judicial administration permit a federal court to defer to a
concurrent state proceeding. ' 2 The Court indicated that conservation of
judicial resources and expeditious disposition of litigation are the fun-
damental considerations underlying judicial dismissal.' Inconvenience of
the federal forum, avoidance of piecemeal litigation, and the extent of
the state proceeding are also pertinent factors in considering whether
dismissal is appropriate."
' Id. at 54. In Younger the Supreme Court held that the possible unconstitutionality of
a state statute does not justify a federal injunction against a state's attempt to enforce the
statute, absent bad faith or harrassment. Id. The Supreme Court noted that the defendant
would have an opportunity to raise constitutional claims in the pending state criminal pro-
ceeding. Id. at 45.
1 The Supreme Court recently extended Younger to prevent federal interference with
a pending state child custody proceeding. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423-24 (1979). In
Sims, the Supreme Court noted that the Younger doctrine also applied to civil proceedings
in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes. Id. at 423, citing Huffman v. Pursue Ltd.,
420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975). Prior to Sims, the Court bad held abstention appropriate if the
state proceeding involved a vital state interest, Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335 (1977), or
vindicated an important state policy, Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977). See
generally, HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 32, at 281 (Supp. 1981); WRIGHT, MILLER &
COOPER, supra note 26, at §§ 4452-4454.
' Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1975). See
generally, WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 26, at § 4247.
40 424 U.S. at 817. See Abrams, Reserved Water Rights, Indian Rights and the Nar-
rowing Scope of Federal Jurisdiction: The Colorado River Decision, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1111,
1122 (1978).
"1 424 U.S. 800 (1975). In Colorado River, the United States sought a declaration of the
Government's rights to waters in certain Colorado rivers. ICE at 805. The Government also
claimed the waters as trustee for certain Indian tribes. Id. Subsequently, one of the water-
users and a defendant in the Government's case filed suit in state court under the
Colorado's Water Rights Determination and Administration Act, which has complex regula-
tions for establishing and enforcing water rights. Id. at 804-05. The federal district court
held that the abstention doctrine required deference to the state proceeding. Id. at 805. The
circuit court reversed, holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1345 established federal jurisdiction and that
abstention was not appropriate. 504 F.2d 115, 119 (1974). On certiorari, the Supreme Court
held that although the abstention doctrine was not applicable, the dismissal was appropriate
for purposes of wise judicial administration. 424 U.S. 800, 817.
" 424 U.S. at 817. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 26, at § 4247.
, Id. at 818.
" Id. at 818-20. In Colorado River, the Supreme Court emphasized that no one factor is
determinative for dismissal. Id. at 818. The federal courts must weigh the obligation to exer-
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In Levy, the Second Circuit relied on Burford, Younger, and Colo-
rado River to justify abstention. 5 The Levy court interpreted Burford
expansively to require abstention in order to avoid federal interference
with a specialized state administrative scheme involving important state
policy." The Levy court noted that New York State has a complex
system for liquidating insurance companies," as well as an unusual in-
terest in the liquidation of insurance companies.48 The Second Circuit
abstained to avoid interfering with the liquidation proceeding. 9 Even
though Levy involved a purely federal question, " the Second Circuit
declined to interfere with a state administrative decision that might
have created inequities in the administration of a state scheme.6'
The Second Circuit also justified abstention under the Younger doc-
trine.2 The Levy court recognized that the Supreme Court has not ex-
tended the Younger rationale for abstention to a proceeding as remote
from the criminal process as an insurance company liquidation., Never-
cise jurisdiction with the pertinent factors which support deference to the concurrent state
proceeding. Id.
635 F.2d at 965.
Id. at 963. In Burford, the Supreme Court recognized that federal court decisions
which misapplied complex state law had created needless conflicts with specialized state
schemes. 319 U.S. at 327-29.
" 635 F.2d at 963; see notes 15-16 supra.
"Id. The Second Circuit reasoned that the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
1011-1015 (1976) evinced a federal policy of state regulation of insurance companies. Id. The
Second Circuit emphasized that in the liquidation proceedings the claims of policyholders
are adjusted by reinsuring existing policies from a state fund. Id.
" Id. at 964. The Second Circuit stressed the importance of consolidating all assets and
claims of an insolvent insurance company in a single forum. Id. (citing Motlow v. Southern
Holding & Securities Corp., 95 F.2d 721, 725-26 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 305 U.S. 609 (1938)).
In Motlow, however, the court was concerned only with the consolidation of assets in a
single forum. 95 F.2d at 725-26. In Levy, the Second Circuit noted that an unfunded benefit
plan did not constitute an asset. 635 F.2d at 968.
ERISA preempts all state law relating to employee benefit plans. ERISA §§ 514(a),
514(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(a), 1144(2)(A) (1976). Whether a qualified ERISA plan existed
and whether termination of the plan following insolvency violated ERISA guidelines are
purely federal questions. See note 6 supra.
" Levy v. Lewis, 635 F.2d 960, 964. The Second Circuit concluded that the superinten-
dent should make the initial determination of whether an ERISA plan existed and its status
in liquidation, with review available in the state courts. Id.
"Id. See text accompanying notes 37-38 supra. Under the Younger doctrine, federal
courts cannot interfere with a pending state criminal prosecution absent compelling cir-
cumstances. 401 U.S. 37, 49 (1971). See generally WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 26,
at §§ 4253-55. Federal injunctive relief is justified only on a showifig of bad faith, harass-
ment, or any unusual circumstances necessitating equitable relief. 401 U.S. at 53-54. The
Supreme Court has extended the Younger types of abstention to civil proceedings involving
vital state interests. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335 (1977). In Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415,
423 n.8 (1979), the Supreme Court relied on Younger to abstain to a state child custody pro-
ceeding, but disclaimed the applicability of Younger to civil proceedings absent a compelling
state interest. See generally WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 26, at § 4254 (Supp.
1980).
" 635 F.2d at 965.
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theless after determining that the liquidation proceeding involved vital
state interests, the Second Circuit reasoned that the principles of com-
ity5 and federalism 5 underlying Younger justified federal deference to
the pending state proceeding. The Second Circuit held that Younger
supported abstention to allow the states to enforce important state in-
terests in state courts.57
The Second Circuit further justified dismissal on principles of wise
judicial administration" derived from Colorado River.5 The Second Cir-
cuit held that the concurrent liquidation proceeding created exceptional
circumstances warranting dismissal for reasons of judicial administra-
tion."0 The Second Circuit deferred to the state proceeding to allow the
Superintendent to consolidate all claims in one forum, avoid duplicative
or piecemeal litigation, and promote the federal policy of state regula-
tion of insurance.61
The Second Circuit improperly abstained from exercising concurring
jurisdiction to decide Levy's ERISA claim. Neither Burford, Younger,
nor Colorado River support federal abstention in Levy.2 By failing to
recognize that the status of an employee benefit plan in a liquidation pro-
ceeding is primarily a federal concern 3 that is separable from the state
- Comity reflects the federal courts' respect for the power and ability of state courts
to uphold and enforce the Constitution. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1974).
Comity requires a federal court not to interfere with an action in state court. McCormack,
Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Pro-
tections, 60 VA. L. REv. 1, 45 (1974).
1 Federalism requires that the federal courts protect iederal rights and federal in-
terests without undue interference in the legitimate activities of the state. Younger v. Har-
ris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
635 F.2d at 965. The Supreme Court has recognized that comity demands a strong
federal policy against federal intervention in the state judicial processes in the absence of ir-
reparable injury to the federal plaintiff. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979). Comity war-
rants federal deference to state civil proceedings involving vital state interests to prevent
the displacement of the state courts by the federal courts. Id.
5' 635 F.2d at 965.
See text accompanying notes 39-44 supra.
" 424 U.S. 800 (1975).
635 F.2d at 965.
61 Id.
See text accompanying. notes 63-83 infra.
ERISA's preemption provision, which preempts all relevant state law, underscores
the superior federal interest in the regulation of employee benefit plans. ERISA § 514(a), 29
U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976); see note 6 supra. In Marshall v. Chase Manhattan Bank, the Second
Circuit noted no discernible state interest in pension plan litigation. 580 F.2d 680, 684 n.6 (2d
Cir. 1977). In Marshall, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of an ac-
tion against the trustee of an ERISA plan. Id. at 680. Even though related claims were pen-
ding in state court, the Second Circuit held abstention improper because ERISA provided
that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over fiduciary claims and preempted all state
law related to ERISA plans. Id. at 684. The Second Circuit ruled that no issue of comity or
federalism supporting abstention arises unless federal constitutional issues are pending
before the state court. Id.
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interest in insurance company liquidation," the Second Circuit miscast
the potential federal-state conflict resulting from concurring jurisdic-
tion. 5 New York State law protects all policyholders, general creditors,
and employees of liquidated insurance companies but does not address
the status of ERIS-A claims." Whether the termination of Levy's bene-
fits violated ERISA does not depend on state law but requires inter-
pretation of a complex federal statute evincing important federal
policy." The exercise of federal jurisdiction to clarify Levy's rights
under ERISA, therefore, would have resolved unsettled issues of federal
law that are independent of the liquidation proceeding. Furthermore,
although New York has a comprehensive scheme for the liquidation of in-
surance companies, the Uniform Insurance Liquidation Act adopted by
New York" does not create a specialized or complex administrative
" The status of an employee benefit plan in a liquidation proceeding is dependent upon
the interpretation of a federal statute which reflects a compelling federal interest. ERISA
evinces a federal policy to protect the interests of participants and beneficiaries in ERISA
plans and provide ready access to federal courts. ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1976).
The Levy court noted that the McCarran-Ferguson Act mandates regulation of in-
surance companies by the individual states. 635 F.2d at 963. An express provision in the Act
provides that no act of Congress shall impair or supersede any state law for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1976). ERISA affirms the policy of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act by providing that ERISA does not alter existing federal law.
ERISA § 514(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1976). Congress also chose not to preempt any state law
which regulates insurance, banking or securities. Id. at § 514(a)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. §
1144(a)(2)(A). State regulation of insurance companies is not preempted by ERISA. State
law regulating insurance, however, may have an indirect yet profound effect on employee
benefit plans. See Note, ERISA Preemption and Indirect Regulation of Employee Welfare
Plans Through State Insurance Law', 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1536, 1537 (1978). As Judge
Mansfield properly recognized in his concurring opinion in Levy, the McCarran-Ferguson
Act does not suggest that federal courts abstain from exercising concurrent jurisdiction
over any claim involving a regulated insurance company. 635 F.2d at 970-71 (Mansfield, J.,
concurring). Furthermore, the establishment of ERISA claims will not affect the claims of
other creditors of CMIC since the creditors' claims are guaranteed by the New York Securi-
ty Fund. Id. at 971. The ERISA claims, therefore, are independent of the outcome of the li-
quidation proceeding. Id.
I Considerations of federalism are a fundamental basis for abstention. WRIGHT,
MILLER & COOPER, supra note 26, at § 4241. Principles of federalism require federal
deference to state court proceedings to preserve harmonious federal-state relations. Id. §
4241 n.45. Whether the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction will disrupt federal-state rela-
tions, therefore, depends in part on the characterization of the respective state and federal
interests in the concurrent proceedings.
" The New York Insurance Law provides priority status for past wages due an.
employee. N.Y. INS. LAW § 537 (McKinney) (1966). The law, however, does not define
"wages." Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, pension plan benefits are treated as
wages. 11 U.S.C. § 507(4) (Supp. 1978) (overruling United States v. Embassy Restaurant, 359
U.S. 29 (1959)).- Insurance companies, however, are exempt from the Bankruptcy Reform
Act. 11 U.S.C. §§ 109 & 301 (Supp. 1978).
" See notes 6, 63, & 64 supra.
" N.Y. INs. LAW §§ 517-24 (McKinney) (1966); see notes 15-16 supra.
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scheme." Absent a complex administrative scheme or a state proceeding
of vital state interest, even a broad interpretation of Burford or Younger
will not support abstention. 0 Neither Burford nor Younger support
federal deference to state courts on issues of unsettled federal law that
are independent of the concurrent state proceeding.
Levy does not present the exceptional and limited circumstances
necessary for a judicial dismissal under Colorado River.71 Adjudication of
Levy's ERISA claim would not result in duplicative or piecemeal litiga-
tion since the ERISA claims do not depend on the outcome of the state li-
quidation proceeding.72 Unlike the claim in Colorado River," resolution
of the federal claim in Levy would not generate additional litigation by
permitting inconsistent dispositions of property.74 Nor would adjudica-
tion undermine the federal policy of state regulation of insurance since
the ERISA claim involves the status of an employee benefit plan and not
the regulation of insurance. 5 By ruling on the merits, the Second Circuit
would expedite the disposition of the case by aiding the state referee in
the proper application of an oblique and complex federal statute.
Although abstention allows the Superintendent to consolidate all claims
against the insolvent insurance company, the Uniform Insurers Liquida-
tion Act does not create a right to an exclusive forum." Consolidation of
claims, therefore, should not excuse a federal court from exercising con-
gressionally granted jurisdiction.7
Finally, considerations of judicial administration support the exer-
cise of concurrent jurisdiction by the Second Circuit due to the inter-
related nature of Levy's ERISA claims. A proper resolution of a fiduci-
" The Uniform Insurance Liquidation Act has been adopted by 32 states. Central
States Fund v. Old Security Life Ins. Co., 600 F.2d 671, 673 n.3 (7th Cir. 1979).
o See text accompanying notes 33-38 supra.
71 See text accompanying notes 41-44 supra. Since a dismissal based on wise judicial
administration is unrelated to regard for federal-state relations, only exceptional cir-
cumstances will permit federal courts to abstain from the obligation to exercise jurisdiction
given them. Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1975); see
notes 39-44 supra.
" See text accompanying note 64 supra.
See 424 U.S. at 819.
" Levy's claim, if allowed, would not adversely affect CMIC's policyholders, since
policyholder claims are guaranteed by the New York Security Fund. 635 F.2d at 971.
" See text accompanying note 64 supra.
7" The Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act expressly authorizes separate claims pro-
ceedings in states adopting the Act. N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 518, 519 (McKinney) (1966); Central
States Fund v. Old Security Life Ins. Co., 600 F.2d 671, 677 (7th Cir. 1979). The Act,
therefore, presumes multiple forum actions.
In Dempsey v. Pink, the Second Circuit asserted jurisdiction to determine the
validity of liens over funds of an insurance company in liquidation, even though the in-
surance company was being liquidated in state court. 92 F.2d 572, 572 (2d Cir. 1937). The Se-
cond Circuit held federal jurisdiction proper to establish the status of the liens in the li-
quidation proceedings where the determination would not interfere with the possession of
the fund in state court. Id at 573.
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ary claim under ERISA depends in part on the type of retirees' benefit
plan involved.78 E RISA covers both retirement plans79 and welfare
benefit plans." Levy argued that CMIC's retiree plan constituted a
retirement plan.8 If CMIC's plans are retirement plans, a plan adminis-
trator may not decrease accrued benefits without the approval of the
Secretary of Labor.82 The characterization of a plan, therefore, is essen-
tial to the determination of Superintendent Lewis's role and obligations
in the plan termination. If the court deemed the superintendent to be a
plan administrator' with the power to amend benefit plans, the amend-
ment of a retirement plan would violate ERISA unless approved by the
Secretary of Labor. A full inquiry into a fiduciary issue under ERISA,
therefore, is dependent in part on the characterization of the benefit
plan. By abstaining, the Second Circuit risked improper resolution of
Levy's fiduciary claim.84 Federal courts should resolve interdependent
federal claims in the same forum to preserve judicial resources and to
dispose comprehensively of litigation. 5
Abstention is a narrow and extraordinary exception to the duty of
the federal courts to exercise congressionally granted jurisdiction. 8
Federal courts should abstain only to avoid interfering with state efforts
to deal with problems of great public import. By abstaining improperly,
T See text accompanying notes 78-83 infra.
n ERISA § 3(2)AB), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(B) (1976); see note 2 supra.
Id § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1); see note 2 supra.
a CMIC's retiree benefit plans provided retirees with various insurance benefits, in-
cluding group life insurance, medical and health insurance and major medical coverage. The
benefits were provided through insurance policies held by CMIC on which CMIC paid
premiums annually out of general operating revenues. Levy v. Lewis, 635 F.2d 960, 962 (2d
Cir. 1980). Levy's plan, therefore, appears to be a welfare benefit plan rather than a retire-
ment plan. The Second Circuit, however, referred to the Levy plan as a retirement plan,
although such a haphazard reference should not be dispositive. See id at 963.
ERISA §§ 204(g), 302(c)(8), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1054(g), 1082(c)(8) (1976). ERISA's vesting
and participation requirements do not apply to welfare benefit plans. Id. § 201(1), 29 U.S.C. §
1051(1).
Id. § 3(16), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16).
Under ERISA, any person who exercises any discretionary authority or control over
the management of a plan or the disposition of its assets is a fiduciary. Id. § 3(21)(A), 29
U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). A fiduciary must exercise his discretion solely in the interest of plan
participants and beneficiaries. Id. §§ 403(c)(1), 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1103(c)(1), 1104(a)(1)(3).
The Levy court, therefore, held that Lewis was not a fiduciary because of his statutory
obligations as liquidator to consolidate and distribute assets for the benefit of all policy
holders and creditors, and not exclusively for the benefit of plan participants. 635 F.2d 960,
967-68. But see Kaleidoscope, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Scroggino, Pension Reporter
(BNA) No. 306, D1-D2 (Trustee in bankruptcy a fiduciary under ERISA).
" The notion that resolution of interdependent claims in one forum promotes judicial
economy underlies both ancillary and pendant jurisdiction. See generally, WRIGHT, MILLER
& COOPER, supra note 26, at §§ 3523 & 3562.
" County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959); see text ac-
companying notes 39-44 supra.
" Smith v. Metropolitan Property & Liability Ins., 629 F.2d 757, 761-62 (1980)
(Mansfield, J., dissenting) (citing Colorado River v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976)).
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the Second Circuit denied Levy any access to a federal forum to enforce
an ERISA claim.88 Courts should consider the congressional purpose
behind the grant of federal jurisdiction before declining to exercise that
jurisdiction.89 Congress did not intend ERISA's grant of concurrent
jurisdiction to close federal courts to protected individuals who have not
initiated an action in state court, 0 or to prevent the adjudication of in-
terdependent claims in one forum." By abstaining, the Levy court
seriously undermined the creation of a uniform scheme regulating
employee benefit plans by leaving important interpretations of a
federal statute to state courts without review in federal courts. 2 If the
federal courts rely on Levy to avoid the exercise of federal jurisdiction,
retirees and employees, dependent on benefit rights in ERISA plans,
may lose promised benefits in terminated plans without access to a
federal forum to vindicate their rights. 3
W. IAN LAIRD
See generally Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 492 (1965); Cheesman v. Carey, 485 F.
Supp. 203, 216 (D.C.N.Y. 1980) (absent exceptional circumstances pending state proceeding
no bar to federal jurisdiction over same subject matter); Zeigler, An Accommodation of the
Younger Doctrine And The Duty of The Federal Courts to Enforce Constitutional
Safeguards In The State Criminal Process, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 266, 278-79 (1976).
By abstaining, the federal courts must assume that the state courts will resolve the
controversy. If the action returns to federal court, res judicata or collateral estoppel should
bar the federal suit. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 26, at § 4247. Under Burford
type abstention, after a federal court defers to state court, res judicata will bar a party from
having the federal district court decide the issue. Baltimore Bank v. Farmers Cheese Corp.,
583 F.2d 104, 108 (3d Cir. 1978) citing M. Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The
Scope of the Pullman Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071, 1153-54 (1974); see Alabama PSC v.
Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951). The Second Circuit has affirmed that res judicata effect
may attach to determinations of administrative agencies. Mitchell v. National Broadcasting
Co., 553 F.2d 265, 268 (2d Cir. 1977).
0 Alabama PSC v. Southern Ry., 411 U.S. 341, 360-62 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing) (abstention improper if conflict with congressional intent).
,0 See note 64 supra.
11 See text accompanying notes 8-11 supra.
See note 88 supra.
90 Congress recognized the potentially devastating impact of termination of retirement
plans on retirees and enacted provisions to cover voluntary and involuntary termination
and provide plan termination insurance. 29 U.S.C. § 1301-80 (1976). ERISA establishes a
United States government corporation, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. (PBG), to ad-
minister a self-insured pension plan termination program. Id. §§ 1301-81. The PBG
guarantees payment of a certain percentage of vested benefits for terminated plans. Id. at §
1322. To be covered, the employer must pay PBG an annual premium. Id. at § 1307. ERISA
imposes liability upon employers who terminate a plan and cause PBG to be liable for the
guaranty. Id. at § 1362. An employer can insure against contingent liability with optional ad-
ditional insurance coverage. Id. at § 1323.
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